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Abstract 
Borehole disposal of spent sealed radioactive sources (SRS) has a number of noticeable 
advantages: 
• Effective radiating protection; 
• Long-term safety of disposal. 
• Operational safety; 
• Easy in operation; 
• Conceptually simple; 
• Simplicity of a design; 
• Easy of erection; 
• Practicability practically everywhere; 
• Low cost; 
• Long practice of application; 
• Retrievable (the new project); 
• Ease in improvement; 
Russian Federation has the leading experience in applying borehole storage/disposal method 
for SRS. A new immobilisation technology for sources being disposed of in underground 
repositories was mastered by 1986 and since then it is used in the country. This method uses 
all advantages of borehole type repositories supplementing them with metal encapsulation of 
sources. Sources being uniformly allocated in the volume of underground vessel are fixed in 
the metal block hence ensuring long-term safety. The dissipation of radiogenic heat from SRS 
is considerably improved, radiation fields are reduced, and direct contact of sources to an 
environment is completely eliminated. The capacity of a typical borehole storage/disposal 
facility is increased almost 6 times applying metal immobilisation. That has made new 
technology extremely favourable economically. The metal immobilisation of SRS is 
considered as an option in Belarus and Ukraine as well as Bulgaria. Immobilisation of sources 
in metal matrices can be a real solution for retrieval of SRS from inadequate repositories.  
Introduction 
Safe disposal of SRS is an important issue faced in many countries [1]. Borehole or well type 
repositories are widely used both for storage and disposal of SRS in many countries of the 
world: Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Latvia, 
Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, USA, India; at the present the republic of South Africa studies 
this option. The history of bore hole disposal totals over 40 years of successful operation. 
Borehole disposal has allowed during many tens of years to store safely SRS, which on their 
parameters are high-level radioactive waste. Despite of it, borehole storage and disposal of 
SRS was not especially discussed in publications. Even IAEA, publishing a large number of 
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documents, in any way did not reflect in the publications practice of well storage and borehole 
disposal of radioactive waste. The storage and disposal of SRS in borehole repositories for the 
first time was considered in the IAEA by the department of waste technology in 1997, and 
this year the department of safety of radioactive waste is preparing for publication a TECDOC 
on the safety of borehole disposal.  
Analysis of storage condition of SRS in borehole repositories carried out in 80-s revealed the 
unsatisfactory degree of safety for free storage of sources in underground vessels. Initially the 
burial technology assumed simple dump of SRS into underground vessels of disposal/storage 
facilities. Thereby sources accumulated at the bottom of underground vessel so even at rather 
low volumetric filling underground capacity the radiation fields in it appeared extremely 
powerful (units - tens of MR/h). SRS generate radiogenic heat, which is dissipated in an 
environment, including the way of air convection. There is an ascending stream of warm air 
from the SRS repository, which can bear radioactive aerosols from the underground vessel. 
Besides this there are convective counter-currents of air, which are increasing the content of 
moisture in the repository by condensation of water on the cold walls of the loading channel.  
The radiolysis of water occurs in powerful radiation fields of SRS with accumulation of 
explosive hydrogen (the lower limit of the explosive contents of hydrogen is 4,2 %). The 
safety of SRS storage is reduced also by accumulation of other radiolysis products.  
The State Unitary Enterprise Moscow SIA “Radon” in the beginning of 80-s developed a new 
SRS disposal technology. In order to ensure long term safety of storage/disposal facilities it 
was suggested to isolate SRS into an additional matrix material. Taking into account 
parameters of typical facilities (up to 50 kg - eqv. of radium per one repository) metal 
matrixes were chosen. The new immobilisation technology for sources being disposed of in 
underground repositories was mastered by 1986. Ministry of Health of the USSR has certified 
the new immobilization method to be applied at regional specialized facilities of the “Radon” 
network. The new method used all available advantages of borehole type repositories 
supplementing them with excellent long-term safety. Sources thus were uniformly allocated in 
the volume of underground vessel, being fixed in the metal block inside it. The dissipation of 
radiogenic heat from SRS is considerably improved, radiation fields are reduced, and direct 
contact of sources to an environment is completely eliminated. Due to it the capacity of a 
typical borehole storage/disposal facility is increased almost by 6 times that has made new 
technology extremely favourable economically [2].  
In 1991 the first mobile immobilization plant was mastered. It enabled application of new 
immobilization method for the entire network of regional facilities of system "Radon". There 
is no necessity to supply each “Radon” type enterprise by immobilizing complexes since the 
SRS immobilisation can be done in campaigns. It is more expedient to have some installations 
in each big region of the country, using it for technological needs as required. To present time 
the SRS immobilisation was carried out at 5 regional facilities "Radon" in Russia: Sergiev 
Posad, Volgograd, Nizhni Novgorod, Ekaterinburg, and Ufa. Besides the immobilization of 
sources was done at Novovoronezh NPP. Total activity of all SRS, which were included in 
metal matrixes in the Russian Federation, exceeds 1 million Ci. The metal immobilisation of 
SRS is planned at other regional enterprises in Russia, being considered as an option in 
Belarus and Ukraine. This method considers as well Bulgaria.  
The purpose of this report is to give an overview of currently applied SRS storage/disposal 
options and to describe the routes of ensuring long-term safety of disposal facilities. 
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Borehole type repositories 
Borehole repositories are of typical design developed by the State Project Institute GSPI at the 
fall 50-s. The typical bore-hole repository (Fig. 1, left) has an underground stainless steel 
cylindrical vessel (5) with diameter 200 mm and height 1500 mm which is placed at 4 m 
depth in a steel-enforced concrete well (3 and 4). The thickness of vessel walls is 5 mm. The 
stainless steel loading channel (2) of the repository has a form of curved (spiral) tube with the 
diameter 108x5 mm. At the upper part of repository there is a carbon steel conical socket (1). 
It provides safe discharging of transport containers. A carbon steel lid closes this socket. The 
concrete wall of repository is surrounded by a clay-cement (or clay) mixture, which fills the 
initial construction hole in original soil as a seal material.  
Originally typical repositories were designed for the disposal of sources with the total 
radioactivity corresponding to an equivalent of 50 kg of radium. The maximum dose rate on 
the surface of repository near the loading channel obeying the design cannot be higher than 
0.82 mR/h. The underground reservoir is heated due to radiogenic heat generation by sources. 




Fig.1. Left: the design of typical bore-hole repository (dimensions in mm). 
1 - carbon steel conical socket, 2 - stainless steel loading channel, 3 - steel-enforced concrete 
well, 4 - concrete, 5 - stainless steel cylindrical vessel, 6 - drainage channel. 
Right: the borehole repository at S. Petersburg RSF Radon. 1- hot cell, 2 –manipulator, 3 –
concrete, 4 –loading channel, 5 –underground vessel. 
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As a rule at regional specialised facilities “Radon” there is a few borehole repositories for the 
disposal of spent sources. In reality there were constructed a number of slightly different 
borehole repositories with similar design to typical one. Besides some of repositories were 
constructed with deviation from the typical design (see Fig.1, right). 
Special containers  (КI-400, КТB-26-12) with upper charging and bottom discharging is 
provided in order to load bore-hole repositories. Dose rate on the surface of containers shall 
be not higher than 200 mR/h that corresponds to III transport category accordingly with 
sanitary rules. For installation of containers at upper part of repository a carbon steel conical 
socket was designed in order to provide safe discharging of containers. A carbon steel lid 
closes the socket after the repository loading. 
Belarus recently put into operation a new advanced design borehole type repository 
envisaging the retrieval of sources [3]. Ukraine besides borehole disposal has developed a 
special container to immobilise SRS using metal matrices [4]. Russia has developed as well a 
new design for long-lived radioactive sources which enable retrieval of underground container 
for transportation to final disposal (Fig.2). This repository-container has an underground 
reservoir for storing sources with the volume 106 dm3. It is designed to store SRS with total 
radioactivity 3,7 1014 Bq (10 kCi). Supplying these repositories with an appropriate 
immobilisation technology one can safely store sources for extended period of times.  
 
 
Fig.2. The design of new borehole repository-container for long-lived sources. 
1 - conical socket, 2 – steel reinforced concrete tube, 3 – shielding lid, 4 – tube, 5 – shot iron, 
6 – filling, 7 - stainless steel loading channel, 8 – vessel, stainless steel walls, 10 – sand. 
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Status of repositories 
Borehole repositories operate since early 60-s. The inspection of repositories using specialised 
tools revealed extremely high radiation field even the radioactivity of sources was far from 
the upper limit. (i.e 50 kg-eqv. of radium). Analysis of storage condition of SRS in borehole 
repositories revealed the unsatisfactory degree of safety for free storage of sources in 
underground vessels. Initially the burial technology assumed simple dump of SRS into 
underground vessels of disposal/storage facilities. Thereby sources accumulated at the bottom 
of underground vessel so even at rather low volumetric filling underground capacity the 
radiation fields in it appeared extremely powerful (units - tens of MR/h). SRS generate 
radiogenic heat, which is dissipated in an environment, including the way of air convection. 
There is an ascending stream of warm air from the SRS repository, which can bear radioactive 
aerosols from the underground vessel. Besides this there are convective counter-currents of 
air, which are increasing the content of moisture in the repository by condensation of water on 
the cold walls of the loading channel. The radiolysis of water occurs in powerful radiation 
fields of SRS with accumulation of explosive hydrogen (the lower limit of the explosive 
contents of hydrogen is 4,2 %). The safety of SRS storage is reduced also by accumulation of 
other radiolysis products.  
Small amounts of water were accumulated in repositories due to condensation of water 
vapours from air on cold walls of loading channel. This is a slow process however during 
many years of operation in dump conditions when there is a flow of hot air from the bottom 
part of repository upward and a flow of dump air downward some portion of water is 
accumulated by condensation in the underground vessel. Large amounts of water in repository 
indicate on poor operation of drainage system. In any case presence of water in repository and 
powerful ionising radiation decreases safety of sources disposal. 
Radiolysis of air and water occurs under the influence of powerful ionising radiation. Oxides 
of nitrogen and ozone are the main products of radiolysis. Radiochemical yield of nitrogen 
oxides is 1.23 molecules/100eV. Concentration of nitrogen oxides in irradiated volume can be 
determined by formula  
C=1.6*10-4*D, 
where D - absorbed dose of radiation in rad. At dose rate about 107 rad/h concentration of 
nitrogen oxides in a closed volume after one day will reach 30 g/l. Ozone is produced with a 
high radiochemical yield 15 molecules/100 eV. Due to its oxidising properties it contributes 
to oxidation of nitrogen oxides to NO2. With water nitrogen peroxide produces nitric acid. 
This nitric acid during multiple moistening-drying on the surface of sealed source can be 
concentrated. Formation of nitric acid contributes to acceleration of source case corrosion. 
Ozonation of water solutions accelerates corrosion also. Besides this mechanical tensions and 
micro-fissures also contribute to accelerated corrosion of cases. These processes caused a 
number of accidents with sealed radiation sources during the operation of irradiation 
installations. Similar conditions are inherent to borehole repositories. In water samples from 
repositories large amounts of suspensions (up to 34 g/l) were observed which were products 
of corrosion. Radiometric analysis of water from repositories showed that radionuclides 
concentration was about 102 - 103 Bq/l. These concentrations can be caused by radionuclides 
diffusion through fissures of SRS cases and residual contamination of sources. In one 
repository concentration of Cs-137 was up to 106 Bq/l that can be explained by seal failure. If 
seal failure occurs borehole repository does not represent a safe barrier and radionuclides 
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release into environment is possible by aerosols during the evaporation of moisture or in the 
form of hot particles. The sources ought to be immobilised to avoid possible release of 
radionuclides. 
Hydrogen is produced during the radiolysis of water. Radiochemical yield of hydrogen is 0.42 
- 0.45 molecules/100 eV. Being accumulated in a closed volume hydrogen can form in 
admixture with air detonating gas. Inferior limit of explosive danger of hydrogen is 4.2 vol.%. 
Maximal time of safe accumulation of hydrogen in a closed volume can be determined by 
formula: 
t=4.03*106*V/(Kγ*Q),    
where V - volume of repository (m3), Kγ - gamma-constant of radionuclide 
(R*cm2/(h*mCi)), Q - activity of source (Ci). For activity of Co-60 sources about 10,000 Ci 
and volume of repository 0.2 m3 the time of safe accumulation of hydrogen is about 6 h. 
Maximum concentration of hydrogen about 3.6 vol.% was observed in a closed bore-hole 
repository. In open repositories the hydrogen concentrations are several times lower.  
The status of borehole repositories is shown below in Table 1. 
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Table I. Status of borehole type repositories at regional specialised facilities (RSF) “Radon”. 
 
## Repository Operating since 
Number of 
SRS Total activity, Ci Filling, % 
Dose rate 
underground, R/h 
Dose rate at the 
entrance, µR/h 
A (metal immobilised) 1979 52 18548 35 120000 60 
B (metal immobilised) 1990 992 72996 50 3000000 70 
C (metal immobilised) 1979 405 18649 37 170000 50 
Sergiev Posad 
(Moscow SIA Radon) 
D (metal immobilised) 1985 1845 73312 84 100000 30 
Nijny Novgorod A (metal immobilised) ? 2325 ? 17 51 15 
A 1963 283 2808 43 478 15 
Rostov 
B 1963 18801 2505 100 23 26000 
A 1963 ? 10000 ? ? ? 
S.Petersburg 
B 1971 ? 73000 3 1380000 60 
Samara A 1985 3283 883 6 58400 11 
Saratov A 1963 2874 6 13 166 16 
A 1964 ? ? ? ? ? 
B (metal immobilised) 1976 ? 1400 ? 782 48 Ufa 
C 1964 ? 200 100 6 40 
A 1990 ? 3351 5 36400 5 
Volgograd 
B (metal immobilised) 1963 ? 1200 53 6 16 
A (metal immobilised) 1988 886 837  132 15 
Ekaterinburg 
B (metal immobilised) 1992 1972 2555  9000 20 
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Immobilisation technology 
Metals have enough radiation durability to be used as matrix material for the immobilisation 
of SRS. In order to facilitate the encapsulation process and to minimise the influence of high 
temperature on radionuclides metals with low melting temperature are used [5]. For damaged 
sources this minimises the volatilisation of radionuclides in the process of their encapsulation.  
Encapsulation involves two steps with melted metal portions varying in volume. In the first 
stage molten metal of temperature above the melting temperature is poured over the sources 
in underground repository vessel. Owing to difference in the specific weight, the sources rise 
to the surface of the melt, and on its crystallization they are fixed on the surface. In the second 
stage of the technological process a thin layer of melt is poured on the surface of metal block 
in order to cover some floating sources. 
In order to obtain a high-performance metal block the melt quantity is calculated depending 
on the temperature of the melt, source activity, and repository thermal properties from the 
following expressions: 
hi ≅ 8.01*10-14εp Ai / π βκ∆T0, 
where κ - effective repository heat conductivity, εp - average energy of one decay, ∆T0 - 
permissible overheating of the repository, Ai - radionuclide activity in specific set of sources, 
β - in this coefficient the effect of repository geometry is included. For typical underground 
borehole repositories ∆T0=503 0K, κ =(2.8+0.3) W/m*K. 
The technological process envisages application of sources immobilisation until the repository 
is filled up (see Fig. 3). 
 
Fig.3. Schematic of SRS immobilisation in borehole repositories. 
Structure of the block obtained and coupling between layers were controlled by the use of 
ultrasonic defectoscopy and testing of the samples for fracture. The measurements showed 
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that only lead and lead based alloys are producing high quality metal blocks without breach of 
integrity. Some aluminium and tin matrix samples had structural defects in the form of even 
boundaries between layers. This was caused by rapid oxidation of surface of the metals 
having the sufficient high reactivity. The lead matrices have a continuous structure with no 
internal and surface defects. 
If SRS contain high volatile radionuclides it is essential to lower melting temperature as much 
as possible and at the same time to provide consistent cohesion between matrix metal layers. 
To attain this aim at first sources are poured by lead-based alloy melt (e.g. Bi50.1-Sn14.6-
Pb24.9-Cd10.8) having low melting temperature. Upon crystallization of the latter the 
technological operations above-mentioned are performed. Investigation of the block obtained 
by ultrasonic defectoscopy has shown no structural defect in the block.  
Table 2. Characteristics of immobilising metals and alloys. 








327 234 177 100 66 
Low-melting alloys with melting temperature below 100 0C (Table 2) are used for spent 
sources immobilization buried in the old repositories flooded by water. For this purpose 
sources are initially poured by melted alloy and if required, water in the repository is heated 
to temperature higher than alloy melting temperature. Owing to significant difference in the 
specific weight, water or water-clay suspension is displaced from sources layer by the melt. 
Upon the pumping out water and drying the repository, metal block melting temperature 
required is achieved by successive pouring of several melted lead portions. 
A series of mobile facilities is available at Moscow SIA “Radon” to immobilise SRS at 
regional specialised facilities “Radon”. One of them is shown in the Fig.4. 
Observations of status of repositories after source immobilisation showed absence of 
hydrogen: its concentration was below registration limits of devices. Besides this both 
radiation fields and temperatures in repositories decrease considerable. Even in the case of 
water impact there was no direct contact of water with sources. No contamination of water 
was observed. 
 




Fig.4. Mobile modular type facility to immobilise SRS in borehole type repositories. 
In 1998-1999 the Moscow SIA “Radon”, State Scientific Centre VNIINM and Institute of 
Biophysics of Russian Academy of Science fulfilled a detailed analysis of spent sealed 
radiation sources safe storage in bore hole repositories. The analysis has showed that reliable 
radionuclide insulation from environment during the whole storage time of 500 (and up 
to1000) years is provided through source’s immobilisation in a metal matrix material (lead 
matrix). Even in the hypothetical case of total flooding with simultaneous damaging of all 
engineering barriers, radionuclides release will cause a summary dose load not exceeding (5.5 
- 7.5)x10-5 Sv/y [6]. The safety analysis has shown a high degree of safety of SRS borehole 
disposal in the case when sources are fixed in metal matrices for at least 500 – 1000 years. 
Even in case of rather improbable events the dose burdens for population will not exceed (5.5 
- 7.5) 10-5 Sv. As in the case of normal evolution scenarios the burden is nil.  
Due to very low corrosion rate of lead and low solubility of lead salts there is practically no 
impact to environment of lead. This impact was assessed to be very low earlier [7] and 
confirmed recently by detailed calculations for near surface repositories containing large 
amounts of lead waste [8]. As for SRS it is deemed that after the decay of radionuclides the 
metal block will be retrieved and recycled.  
Conclusion 
Bore hole repositories operate successfully over 40 years. They have allowed during many 
tens of years to store safely SRS. The conception of disposal of SRS into borehole 
repositories was developed in former USSR to the end of 50-s - beginning of 60-s. Presently 
borehole repositories are used at many regional specialised facilities “Radon” in Russian 
Federation as well as in other countries. The borehole disposal-storage is supplemented by 
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metal encapsulation of sources. Sources are fixed in the metal block hence long-term safety is 
ensured by high durability of metal matrix immobilising sources. At present time the design 
of borehole repositories is improved envisaging the possibility to retrieve the metal block with 
sources. 
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